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Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea
Bargaining: What is the Standard?
INTRODUCTION
Now that plea bargaining has attained overt recognition as an
accepted and vital method in the system of criminal justice,' the prob-
lems and dangers incidental thereto have become the subject of increas-
ing concern. One such problem arises from the role of defense counsel
in the plea bargaining process and, of more importance, the effective-
ness of that role as it directly relates to the criminal defendant's
underlying plea. This comment will focus on this subject by discussing
and scrutinizing the standards of effective assistance of counsel enunci-
ated by past and present case law dealing with the individual problems
indigenous to the plea bargaining stage where effective assistance is an
indispensible requirement. This discussion will expose the urgent need
for the judicial formulation of a more realistic and reasonable standard
of effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining.
THE PROBLEM
The difficulty of retrospectively determining effective assistance be-
comes especially apparent when one considers the frequency and the
facility with which the accusation of ineffective assistance can be made.
The disenchanted accused has often been readily disposed to place
the blame for his position upon the "erroneous" advice or strategy of
his attorney whose integral role in the plea bargaining process makes
him a ripe target for such charges. But since the courts have assured
that counsel is anything but a vulnerable target, a dilemma emerges
between the desire to protect lawyers from frivolous and negligible
claims and the need to extract bona fide cases of ineffective assistance
from the multitude of accusations-for on occasion, cries of ineffective
assistance are not entirely unfounded. In response to this perplexing
situation, the courts have attempted to reconcile these opposing forces
by means of some rather nebulous, long-established standards of effec-
1. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J.
GrIM. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromise by Prosecution
to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
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tive assistance of counsel which were never initially designed to deal
with the crucial interdependence between effective assistance and the
voluntarily and understandingly tendered plea. Consequently, courts
as well as defense lawyers are now required to reassess former con-
cepts of effective assistance of counsel and all of their accompanying
standards in light of a rather new method: plea bargaining.
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN GENERAL
It is impossible to consider the emerging influence of effective as-
sistance of counsel in the specific setting of plea bargaining without
first briefly surveying the background against which the constitutional
requirement of effective assistance of counsel developed.2 Powell v.
Alabama" is invariably pointed to as a meager but rather significant
recognition by the United States Supreme Court that the duty to ap-
point counsel is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or
under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in
the preparation of the case. In Powell it was declared that "the failure
- . . to make an effective appointment of counsel was a denial of due
process within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment." 4 Unfor-
tunately, the courts have had little to add to this rather cursory com-
ment on effective assistance. Perhaps this can be attributed to the diffi-
culty of defining a conceptual gauge for measuring effective assistance
as well as an understandable fear among appellate judges that too
lenient a standard would inevitably result in an inundation of appeals
for reversal on the grounds of tactical or strategic errors.
REVIEWING EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
ON APPEAL AND IN HABEAS CORPUS
The constitutional standard of ineffective assistance amounting to
a denial of due process was conceived in great part from this judicial
apprehension and, therefore, ultimately became framed in terms of "a
mockery of justice,' 5 "so inept as to reduce the representation to a
2. See generally Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process,
54 MINN. L. REv. 1175 (1970); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a
Ground for Post-Conviction Relief, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 289 (1964); Note, Effective Assistance
of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1435 (1965); Note, Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. REv. 1531 (1963).
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. Id. at 71.
5. Slawek v. United States, 413 F.2d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1969); Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d
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farce," "shocking to the conscience of the reviewing court,"7 or "a de-
liberate abdication of an attorney's ethical duty to his client." In effect,
the derelictions on the part of counsel must have been of an extremely
serious nature before a claim of ineffective assistance would be upheld.
These standards have changed little since the early pronouncements
and, as a result, considerable deference is still given to a lawyer's
judgment except in the most radically apparent cases of incompetence.
Quite often the courts are satisfied with almost any explanation for an
attorney's failure.9
The standard of effective assistance in habeas corpus petitions for
which an evidentiary hearing is required necessitates that counsel's
competence or loyalty be placed in question by substantial allegations
of fact.10 The mere assertion by a petitioner that "he retrospectively
considers counsel's advice to have been ungainly does little more than
tilt at windmills."" Again, the standard of effective assistance is de-
signed to discourage frivolous claims based upon a hindsight analysis
of counsel's tactics. A petitioner cannot claim inadequate representa-
tion when counsel's decisions are born of difficult tactical judgments
as opposed to grave tactical mistakes.' 2 Only the latter are capable of
calling into question the competency or loyalty of an attorney.'8
It can thus be concluded that the standards of effective representa-
tion both on appeal and in petition for habeas corpus are intentionally
strict and evasive in order to protect attorneys from the potentially un-
243, 247 (5th Cir. 1966); Peck v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 1963); Rivera v.
United States, 318 F.2d 606, 608 (9th Cir. 1963).
6. Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75, 79 (5th Cir. 1966); Bouchard v. United States, 344
F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1965); Lyons v. United States, 325 F.2d 370, 377 (9th Cir. 1963);
Snead v. Smyth, 273 F.2d 838, 842 (4th Cir. 1959): United States ex rel. Feely v. Ragen,
166 F.2d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 1948); People v. Washington, 41 111. 16, 18, 241 N.E.2d 425,
428 (1968).
7. Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 220, 230 (8th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Wright, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 950 (1950).
8. Robinson v. United States, 448 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1971).
9. Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. RFv. 1531, 1539 (1963) (where foot-
note 57 points this out particularly with regard to an attorney's failure to raise an in-
sanity defense). See People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952) (refused to find
ineffective assistance despite a long history of episodes suggesting an unbalanced mind
simply because the accused insisted at trial that he did not commit the offense). "A
prisoner who insists that he did not commit a crime can hardly be forced by counsel to
confess in order to support a tenuous defense of insanity." Snider v. Cunningham, 292
F.2d 683, 685 (4th Cir. 1961).
10. See Diamond v. United States, 432 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1970). See generally C. WRiGHT,
FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE (CRIMINAL) § 595, at 611 (1969).
11. Redus v. Swenson, 468 F.2d 606, 607 (8th Cir. 1972).
12. See United States v. Eaton, 416 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1969) (an attorney's failure to




limited complaints of disappointed clients readily inclined to blame
their plight upon poor trial or appellate representation. It must also
be noted that the standards are negatively stated in terms of what coun-
sel must not do, and only once has a standard of active advocacy and
best efforts been promulgated.14
THE VOLUNTARY AND UNDERSTANDING PLEA-
EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY
Although a lawyer's role in the plea bargaining process often re-
quires, and in most cases is given, the same insulation from attack
through the utilization of these standards of gross error and shocking
incompetency, the unique nature of plea negotiation makes it espe-
cially conducive to abuse and presents different constitutional and
practical problems requiring special treatment. An analysis of these
problems must, therefore, commence with a brief discussion of the
constitutional requirements for a valid plea.
The tender of a guilty plea is constitutionally permissible even
though it is the result of a plea bargain if it is otherwise voluntarily
and understandingly made.15 Consequently, the fact that the plea must
be the product of an understanding and uncoerced act inevitably
brings into consideration the caliber of defense counsel's representa-
tion. Indeed, the concepts of voluntariness and competent assistance
of counsel are intrinsic complementary requisites to any valid plea
negotiation. This was impliedly conveyed in Brady v. United States",
where the majority remarked that a defendant's plea must be the
voluntary product of "competent counsel and full opportunity to as-
sess the advantages and disadvantages of a trial as compared with
those attending a plea of guilty."' 7 Earlier, in Moore v. Michigan8
recognition was given to the need for counsel at the critical plea stage.
And before that, in Kercheval v. United States's it was urged that "a
14. Anders v. California, 386 US. 738 (1967) (required that an advocate support his
client's appeal to the best of his ability).
15. See generally Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain
justice, 46 J. CimU. L.C. & P.S. 780 (1956); White, A Proposal for Reform in the Plea
Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1971); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea
Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1387 (1970); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromise by
Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
16. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
17. id. at 744.
18. 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
19. 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
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plea of guilty shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after
proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences."
20
Therefore, counsel's role as an advisor, tactician, and guardian cannot
be ignored when one considers the standard to which a defense at-
torney should be held when bargaining for his client in the market
place of criminal justice. Effective assistance of counsel must include
an awareness of the unavoidable fact that legal advice from a com-
petent attorney at the pleading stage concerning the specific offenses
alleged is essential to a criminal defendant.
21
THE EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN PLEA BARGAINING
Unfortunately, as will be seen, the courts have been equally hesitant
in critically evaluating a defense attorney's judgment in the context
of plea bargaining as they have been in other areas of advocacy. It
has even been remarked that more is required of an attorney where
the plea is not guilty than in the case of a guilty plea.22 Hence, it is
not surprising that the same oft-repeated phrases used to limit hind-
sight evaluation of trial advocacy such as "shocking to the conscience
of the court," 28 "gross error,"24 "such dereliction as to make a farce of
the proceedings ' 25 and "a mockery of justice ' 28 are utilized by the
courts in order to dispose of claims of ineffective assistance during the
plea bargaining process.
As will be more fully developed, these standards of gross incom-
petency have at times proved to be too extreme by failing to encom-
pass the poor type of advocacy which can be a frequent occurrence in
plea bargaining where appointed lawyers are sometimes pressured into
hasty and unprepared decisions for their clients. These standards also
neglect to make a distinction between trial advocacy and advocacy dur-
ing plea bargaining where, due to its condensed nature, there is less
activity on the part of counsel from which the court can make a de-
termination of gross incompetency. Above all, such standards were
never initially formulated to contend with the unwaivering require-
20. Id. at 223.
21. Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromise by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas,
112 U. PA. L. REv. 865, 888 (1964).
22. Lamb v. Beto, 423 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1970); Winters v. Cook, 333 F. Supp. 1033
(N.D. Miss. 1971).
23. United States ex rel. Johnson v. Russell, 444 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1971).
24. Tiru v. United States, 314 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
25. Morris v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
26. Burnside v. Sigler, 329 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Neb. 1971).
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ments of voluntariness and understanding which must be at the foun-
dation of a valid plea.
THE EARLY CASES
Since plea bargaining and its attendant problems are of relatively
recent origin, there is a paucity of early case law on the subject. How-
ever, several courts have dealt with claims of ineffective assistance dur-
ing the plea bargain stage prior to Brady27 and its related case law. A
common standard has emerged from these early decisions--a standard
which has hardly been eroded by subsequent case law despite the wider
use and greater familiarity with plea bargaining that is characteristic
of present day criminal law.
MISREPRESENTATIONS, LEGAL AND FACTUAL ERRORS: THE
VALIDLY BARGAINED FOR PLEA
People v. Gilbert28 is perhaps the most prominent early confronta-
tion with an allegation of ineffective assistance during a plea bargiin.
Gilbert required that in order for a claim of ineffective assistance to
be sustained it must appear that counsel unqualifiedly and falsely rep-
resented that the state had accepted a plea bargain, and that the de-
fendant justifiably relied on such a misrepresentation. Other courts
having had occasion to consider the problem have supplemented the
Gilbert requirement by demanding that an attorney's misrepresenta-
tions be of such a character as to be "shocking to the conscience of the
court" rather than mere expressions of'expectation.2 9
The early decisions have also indicated that pleas entered into in
reliance upon a lawyer's factual or legil errors were nevertheless validly
bargained for pleas. In United States v. Parrinos° it was ruled that
although counsel had given clearly erroneous advice that conviction
would not subject his client to deportation such error did not amount
to a manifest injustice in the absence of unprofessional conduct. Sim-
27. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
28. 25 Cal. 2d 422, 154 P.2d 657 (1944).
29. Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945) (counsel's
statement that the judge would lessen the sentence because the bargain was a "mere ex-
pection"); Monroe v. Huff, 145 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1944); United States ex rel. Wilkins v.
Banmiller, 205 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 325 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1963).
30. 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954). See Meredith v. United States, 208 F.2d 680 (4th Cir.
1953).
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ilarly, in Georges v. United States3 an attorney's mistaken calculation
of maximum sentence due to a careless reading of the indictment was
an insufficient ground for plea withdrawal.
In addition, one can discern a reluctance among the pre-Brady2
decisions to grant relief on ineffective assistance grounds when a lawyer
erroneously fails to advise his client of an inadmissible confession or
other items subject to possible suppression.3" This attitude, which has
persisted down to the present, was, and is, the most damaging to the
defendant, due to the fact that the pursuance of valid suppression is-
sues could greatly enhance the bargaining position. Certainly, the
failure to make use of the advantageous tool of suppression motions
should in many cases be condemned as ineffective assistance of counsel.
FAILURE TO RAISE AN
IMPORTANT DEFENSE
The failure to raise an important defense would seem to present a
lucid example of ineffective assistance; however, here again the strictly
designed standards of ineffective assistance have intervened on counsel's
behalf. For example, in People v. Heirens34 the defendant was advised
to plead guilty despite the existence of a strong defense of insanity.
The court rejected any claims of incompetence remarking that "the
mere fact that counsel failed to advise their client to defend on such
grounds [insanity] does not amount to a denial of due process . . .
and the decision not to advise such a defense, even if it were a mistake,
does not of itself show that the defendant was inadequately repre-
sented. 31 5 The opinion then said that counsel's error was not such as
to amount to a "farce" or a "mockery of justice."36 The rarely arrived
at opposite conclusion was reached in Evans v. Kropp37 where ineffec-
tive assistance was found when the defendant's lawyer advised a guilty
plea in the face of a substantial exculpatory defense. Yet on the whole,
the courts have favored the Heirens approach of upholding an at-
torney's decision to forego a particular defense, regardless of its sub-
stantiality, without a showing of extremely gross dereliction.
31. 262 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1959).
32. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
33. Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 847 (1958).
34. 4 I11. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954).
35. Id. at 137, 122 N.E.2d at 238.
36. Id. at 138, 122 N.E.2d at 238.
37. 254 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (counsel withheld such critical information as
the diagnosed mental incompetency of his client.
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THE STANDARD oV EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE IN THE PRE-Brady CASES
As the above discussed early cases confronting the problem of effec-
tive assistance and the voluntary plea reveal, relief was difficult to
obtain despite the presence of clear errors of law and substantial mis-
representations of fact; errors which would seem to fall below any rea-
sonable standard of adequacy, particularly in the sphere of plea bar-
gaining due to "the uniquely prejudicial nature of the guilty plea to
the defendant."38 Basically, all that the early cases required was little
more than minimal assistance so as not to "shock the conscience of the
court" or amount to a "breach of legal duty."39 However, there are
innumerable cases of poor and erroneous advice in the area of plea
negotiation which fall short of the rare instance of counsel who barely
does anything for his client so as to make applicable the standards of
shocking incompetency. Although certain recent decisions depart from
the conservative fabric of the early case law, the authority supplied by
these cases has hardly been altered primarily because of the exigencies
of modern criminal justice.
McMANN v. RICHARDSON
The perplexing problem of ineffective assistance of counsel and the
voluntary and intelligent plea finally confronted the United States
Supreme Court in 1970. McMann v. Richardson40 established the
criteria for determining when, upon a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in a federal district court, a counseled defendant who seeks to
set aside his guilty plea is entitled to a hearing thereon. More specifi-
cally, McMann directed itself to the crucial inquiry as to the standard
of effective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage, and the
determination of when counsel's competency is so ineffective as to
render a plea an unintelligent and voidable act.
Counsel's alleged error in McMann was in advising a guilty plea
rather than going to trial and challenging the New York procedure for
38. Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARV. L. REV.
1435, 1442 (1965).
39. See Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Boucher
v. Reincke, 341 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Horton, 334 F.2d 153 (2d Cir.
1965); Kennedy v. United States, 259 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S; 994
(1959).
40. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). See Parker v. North Carolinai 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
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determining the admissibility of confession-a procedure which was
eventually struck down in Jackson v. Denno.41 The court refused to
find ineffective assistance. The majority through Justice White re-
marked:
In our view a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably
competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the
grounds that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the
defendant's confession. Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent,
and, therefore, vulnerable when motivated by a confession er-
roneously thought admissible depends as an initial matter not
on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel's ad-
vice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within
the range of competency demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.42
The majority also emphasized the uncertainty in evaluating an attor-
ney's advice to plead guilty and the "inherent risk that good faith
evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mis-
taken."48 In the final analysis, an attorney's decisions during plea nego-
tiation need not always withstand retrospective examination in a post-
conviction hearing for a guilty plea to be voluntary and intelligent.
THE RANGE OF COMPETENCY TEST
Although the bulk of McMann's language regarding effective assis-
tance of counsel conveys a penchant for normal and reasonable com-
petency, a reversion to the extreme standard of gross error does appear
in the opinion. The Court demanded that gross error and "serious
derelictions" be demonstrated in order for the defendants to successfully
claim ineffective assistance. 44 Yet despite this comment, the McMann
decision, intentionally or unintentionally, evinces a somewhat more
lenient standard of effective assistance by demanding at least reason-
ably competent advocacy with the client assuming the risk only for
"ordinary error" 45 within the "range of competency" of attorneys in
criminal cases. Hence, if one can isolate the language pertaining to
reasonable competency, the need to show serious derelictions or gross
error is greatly relaxed, and the criminal defendant can more readily
question the effectiveness of his attorney's advice to accept a plea bar-
41. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
42. 397 U.S. at 771 (1970) (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 770.
44. Id. at 774.
45. Id.
329
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gain rather than go to trial if such advice was not within a criminal
attorney's "range of competency." The "range of competency" standard
is one of normal competency" required for effective assistance in the
peculiar atmosphere of plea bargaining rather than such competency
as not to be shocking or a mockery of justice. Therefore, it is a standard
that better conforms to what should be the plea requirements of volun-
tariness and understanding.
THE RECENT DECISIONS
The "range of competency" test promulgated in McMann v. Rich-
ardson has been frequently evoked by the courts in conjunction with
the older standards of gross incompetency. 47 Predictably, the courts
have generally followed the United States Supreme Court's example
by refusing to sever the "range of competency" test from those of gross
error and shocking dereliction, thus reducing the reasonable advocacy
requirement to virtually a redundant equivalent. As a consequence,
guilty pleas are insulated from attack now as in the early cases. The
"range of competency" test has thus been de-emphasized primarily due
to the court's desire to give attorneys as much tactical leeway as possible.
CLEAR CASES OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
In some instances, the courts are in general agreement that certain
conduct by an attorney clearly amounts to ineffective assistance, even
under the harsher standards. For example, it has been consistently
decided that it is shocking incompetency and a breach of an attorney's
duty to his client for a criminal defense lawyer to urge a client to
plead guilty in the face of repeated protestations of innocence.48 This
requirement protects defendants from overbearing coercion on the
part of lawyers who are obviously not willing to undergo the timely
procedure of trial. Of course, there may be circumstances of over-
whelming evidence against an accused so that counsel's decision to
46. See Diamond v. United States, 432 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1970).
47. The survey of recent cases here will be confined to federal court decisions where
claims of ineffective assistance are most abundant, specifically in petitions for habeas
corpus.
48. Colson v. Smith, 438 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1971). See United States v. Rogers, 289
F. Supp. 726 (D. Conn. 1968).
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accept a bargain and advise a plea represents the only realistic alterna-
tive.49
Another act of incompetency invariably labeled as ineffective assis-
tance ocurs when an attorney advises the entry of a guilty plea while
he is in collusion with the judge,50 or as an agent of the prosecution.5'
Obviously, these are examples of ineffective assistance which lie con-
siderably beyond the perimeter of competency and loyalty demanded
of lawyers in criminal cases. The difficult problems in defining a
standard of legal representation sufficient to assure a valid guilty plea
arise elsewhere: in the judgment area where hindsight evaluation has
always manifested a fear to tread.
SUPPRESSION MOTIONS
An attorney's failure to inform his client of the possible inadmissi-
bility at trial of a coerced confession or of evidence seized in violation
of fourth amendment rights is a frequent charge of ineffective assis-
tance during the plea bargain. Although many claims are unfounded,
the McMann and other standards are necessarily utilized in an effort
to determine whether counsel's failure to challenge the illegally ob-
tained evidence was a judgment error within the "range of compe-
tency" of most criminal lawyers or an omission indicative of inept rep-
resentation. Stress is always laid on the determination whether the
attorney believed that he was taking the wisest course in advising the
guilty plea. 2 This subjective analysis of counsel's strategy is not, how-
ever, the only examination of effective assistance undertaken by the
courts. Inquiry is ultimately made into the magnitude of counsel's
error as it bears directly upon a defendant's entry of a voluntary and
intelligent plea.53 Mere bold assertions that a defendant would not
have pleaded guilty but for the misinformation from his lawyer as to
the status of a motion to suppress will not be sustained in the absence
of an allegation indicating the prejudicial character of the evidence
49. Letter to the Advisory Committee on the Criminal Trial of ABA Project on Mini-
mum Standards for Criminal Justice, April 12, 1967.
50. United States ex rel. Davis v. Yeager. 453 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1971).
51. See Burnside v. Sigler, 329 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Neb. 1971) (the allegation was rejected).
52. Friedman v. Field, 328 F. Supp. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
53. See United States ex rel. Felton v. Rundle, 343 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Maddox v. Sigler, 325 F. Supp. 978 (D. Neb.), aff'd per cur'iam, 445 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1971);
Morris v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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seized. 54 Counsel's misjudgment must be substantial before reviewing
courts will be willing to condemn the error as culminating in ineffec-
tive assistance.55 Again, it must be noted that a great degree of latitude
is given to an attorney's tactical judgments.
In United States ex rel. Watson v. Lindseyr6 petitioner complained
that his guilty plea was involuntary by reason of counsel's failure to
move to suppress the fruits of an unlawful arrest. In addition, it was
contended that an attorney lacks normal competency unless in all but
the frivolous cases he files motions to suppress in order to enhance the
bargaining position of his client. The court predictably refused to ac-
cept this contention. To have adopted such a requirement would cer-
tainly have expanded the concept of a criminal lawyer's "range of com-
petency" but would have simultaneously imposed a rather burdensome
demand upon attorneys involved in plea negotiations. Although de-
fendants are frequently the victims of inadequate representation due
to the imposing demand for swift and thrifty justice such a requirement
would usurp a lawyer's prerogatory right to form his own judgments
during the plea bargaining process, forcing him to be judged by the
amount of suppression motions that he files.
It is suggested that the suppression question should be considered in
terms of defense counsel's overall representation as it directly bears
upon the notion of a voluntary and understanding plea. Only when
it can be said that a client's plea was understandingly made in spiie of
counsel's failure to inform him about a suppression motion can effec-
tive representation be recognized. This is especially true when fourth
amendment claims exist and present at least a close case in which a
normally competent attorney would advise that a suppression motion
be filed.57 It is in just such a situation that the accused deserves a rea-
sonably effective advocate to either ameliorate his bargaining position
or advise him to forego the guilty plea and proceed to trial. Ineffective
assistance was recognized on this basis in United States ex rel. Wakely
v. Russell" when counsel failed to inform his client that he could chal-
lenge an involuntary confession; the guilty plea was thus induced with-
out the requisite understanding.
54. United States ex rel. Seible v. Lavallee, 450 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1971).
55. Id.
56. 461 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1972).
57. United States ex tel. Watson v. Mazurkiewicz, 326 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
But see Turley v. Swenson, 314 F. Supp. 1304 (W.D. Mo. 1970).
58. 315 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Pa. 1970). See Mitchell v. Henderson, 432 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.
1970).
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In general, however, the fact that an attorney advised a guilty plea
on the mistaken belief as to the admissibility of evidence does not un-
dermine the plea unless the mistaken evaluation amounted to con-
duct so completely inept and incompetent as to render the proceeding
a farce.59 As a result, the rigid plea requirements of voluntariness and
understanding are made quite a bit more flexible than one would con-
stitutionally expect them to be.
INSUFFICIENT PREPARATION
It falls upon a lawyer "to see to it that any advice . . .will be the
result of a thorough investigation. '"60 The importance of an attorney's
duty to adequately prepare before entering a plea bargain is widely
recognized. But the real difficulty is encountered in determining the
point at which a lawyer's insufficient preparation is deemed to amount
to ineffective assistance.
Appointed lawyers are frequently the targets of insufficient prepara-
tion charges. Their clients are often advised to accept "bargains" in
reliance upon poorly prepared legal advice. Consequently, they enter
pleas upon inadequate information only to find out later the difficulty
involved in overturning a plea if counsel's unpreparedness was not
considered to be a serious dereliction or gross error-even if it would
not be considered to be within the "range of competency" demanded
of criminal lawyers. The McMann concept of normally competent ad-
vocacy as opposed to the extreme standards of gross error is virtually
ignored as an independent standard of effective assistance, and as a
result, the notion of an understanding plea based upon effective rep-
resentation is often an illusory concept.
Adequacy of representation is not determined solely on the basis of
the amount of time that a lawyer spent interviewing a particular de-
fendant 6' or investigating avenues of defense. The question of prep-
aration is pertinent only to the extent that it bears upon voluntariness
and understanding. 62 More than a mere "perfunctory investigation"
must be conducted or the underlying plea made in reliance thereon
59. Redus v. Swenson, 339 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Mo. 1972); Welborn v. Cox, 337 F. Supp.
16 (W.D. Va. 1971); Pickett v. Henry, 315 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Morris v. United
States, 315 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
60. McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Va. 1972).
61. See Howard v. Beto, 466 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1972).
62. Missouri v. Turley, 443 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1971).
333
Duquesne Law Review
will be nullified.63 Counsel must at least investigate to determine if a
guilty plea is being made knowingly and voluntarily. 4
Ineffective assistance was acknowledged in DuBois v. Mancusi6
when an assigned attorney was only vaguely familiar with his client's
case so as to preclude a knowingly tendered plea. The necessary rela-
tion between effective advocacy and a valid plea bargain is insured by
such a decision. Nevertheless, the majority of cases have granted relief
primarily, if not solely, when counsel's advice smacked of shocking in-
competency. For example, in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Russell6
a public defender who neither had the defendant's file nor knew any-
thing about the case advised a guilty plea. The court refused to recog-
nize ineffective assistance because it was not a shocking dereliction for
counsel to advise a guilty plea on the basis of an interview with the
defendant. In another case competency was deemed to be present, even
though an attorney suggested a guilty plea in the face of a possible in-
sanity defense without first waiting for the report of a psychiatric ex-
amination.6 7
The failure to investigate a client's only possible defense constitutes
ineffective assistance in most cases because gross error is almost always
present."" Poor preparation by neglecting to interview witnesses, how-
ever, is usually not of itself considered to be indicative of ineffective
assistance 0 unless it can be shown that such inadvertence resulted in
the lawyer's ignorance of available evidence which would have sub-
stantially benefited the accused.70
In the great majority of cases a plea will be upheld if the record
shows that advice was based on counsel's weighing of the strength of
the evidence and the reasonable likelihood of a reduced sentence.71
No one factor is usually enough to taint an attorney's assistance as in-
effective. Even his own admission of unpreparedness will not alone
undermine a plea that he had recommended to a defendant.7 2 The
"range of competency" in this area thus frequently extends to the
63. Jackson v. Cox, 435 F.2d 1089 (4th Cir. 1970).
64. Black v. Beto, 327 F. Supp. 1405 (W.D. Texas 1971).
65. 325 F. Supp. 694 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
66. 444 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1971).
67. Nicholson v. Sigler, 325 F. Supp. 957 (D. Neb. 1971).
68. See Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1972); Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636
(5th Cir. 1970).
69. United States v. Johnson, 466 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1972); Burnside v. Sigler, 329 F.
Supp. 1257 (D. Neb. 1971).
70. Winters v. Cook, 333 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
71. United States ex rel. Watson v. Lindsey, 461 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1972).
72. See United States ex rel. Martinez v. Mancusi, 455 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1972).
334
Vol. 12: 321, 1973
Comments
danger zone of shocking incompetency; a standard difficult to violate
even for appointed lawyers who frequently suggest the guilty plea at
the initial interview, 73 as occurred in United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Russell.7 4 Pleas are hardly bargained for under such circumstances, and
defendants are made to pay the price for their lawyer's lack of inves-
tigation and preparation, which most probably deprived their pleas of
voluntariness and understanding.
MISCELLANEOUS GROUNDS
In addition to allegations of poor preparation and the failure to in-
form a client about possible suppression issues, there are miscellaneous,
somewhat associated, grounds for claims of ineffective assistance. Here,
despite the different factual settings, the common fault complained of
in counsel's representation is specific legal or factual misinformation.
In United States ex rel. Scott v. Mancusi75 the defendant's attorney
assured him that a plea could be withdrawn by him unilaterally de-
spite the fact that New York law only allows the withdrawal of a plea
in the discretion of the trial judge. On petition for habeas corpus it
was decided that this misstatement of law was not so serious as to result
in the involuntariness of the plea. The dissent, however, objected to
the majority's ruling by concluding that this was advice which an
ordinarily competent attorney should have been able to give without
difficulty.76 The dissent's interpretation of what is expected of a rea-
sonably adequate criminal attorney seems to be eminently more real-
istic as well as sympathetic to the unique problems of defendants who
are advised to waive valuable rights,77 on the basis of inaccurate legal
information. Once again emphasis is placed upon gross error rather
than reasonably competent representation. Hence, it should not be
surprising that relief has been denied in a multitude of other cases
where an attorney's advocacy was attacked for sundry reasons.
A lawyer's neglect to inform his client of the right to appeal78 or
that an insanity defense could not be raised on appeal79 were errors
not deemed significant enough to nullify a plea entered in ignorance
73. Blumberg, Covert Contingencies in the Right to Assistance of Counsel, 20 VAND.
L. REv. 581, 603 (1967).
74. 444 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1971).
75. 429 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1970).
76. Id. at 115.
77. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
78. Hale v. Cox, 336 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D. Va. 1972).
79. Allen v. Van Cantfort, 436 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1971).
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of these facts. Erroneous advice as to sentencing is normally not a
ground for relief but a grossly inaccurate calculation will certainly
abrogate a plea made in reliance thereon.8 0 The failure to inform a
client of his standing to possibly challenge the array of a jury by ob-
jecting to the systematic exclusion of a certain class from jury service
was not a sufficient indication of incompetency in Winters v. Cook,"
because it did not amount to a mockery of justice. Finally, a lawyer's
representation was upheld even though he carelessly omitted to inform
his client of a corroboration requirement for conviction.8 2
There are a variety of circumstances under which ineffective assis-
tance has been alleged. It can be observed from this sampling, however,
that the bulk of cases subsequent to the McMann decision have gen-
erally remained steadfastly committed to the long prevailing standards
of ineffective assistance by focusing upon serious error and shocking
dereliction rather than normal representation within the "range of
competency" of a criminal lawyer. The defendant's right to enter an
intelligent plea can thus be snatched from him without any significant
means of post-sentencing redress. The most that he can hope for is
that his attorney's miscalculation or error of law was gross enough to
transmit a lively shock to the reviewing court either on appeal or in
a petition for habeas corpus. In all other cases falling somewhere be-
tween the normally competent range and the mockery of justice ex-
treme the defendant must console himself with the thought that his
plea has saved time and expense for the criminal justice system.
TiE NEED FOR A REASONABLE STANDARD OF
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE IN PLEA BARGAINING
The survey of recent case law dealing with ineffective assistance in
plea negotiation unquestionably demonstrates the continued vitality
and the dominance of the older general standards of effective advocacy.
It is suggested, however, that the need for a more demanding con-
stitutional standard of reasonably effective assistance cannot be ignored
if due process is to be made available to the criminal defendant nego-
80. See Cook v. United States, 461 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1972) (counsel induced a defen-
dant to plead guilty on the patently erroneous advice that if he did not do so he would
be subject to a sentence six times more severe than which was actually allowed).
81. 333 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
82. Bostick v. Craven, 429 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1970).
336
Vol. 12: 321, 1973
Comments
tiating with his plea. The courts are, therefore, urged to adopt a stan-
dard of effective representation which reflects the importance of coun-
sel's role in advising a guilty plea pursuant to a bargain with the
prosecution; a standard which insures that plea bargaining will not
make the criminal defendant the victim of a system of justice insensi-
tive to rights and simply devoted to an expedient solution to the ex-
pense and time of trials.
APPOINTED COUNSEL:
ECONOMY OF TIME vs. ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION
It has been capably and soundly suggested that pleas are often en-
tered into on the faulty advice of defense attorneys, acting as "agent
mediators," concerned to a great degree with strategies which tend to
lead to guilty pleas.83 Particularly in the case of legal aid and appointed
lawyers the guilty plea is employed as a quick way out of harrassment
and pressure. 4 Frequently, the criminal lawyer's vested interest in his
client's case is to limit its scope and duration via the guilty plea. 5
Hence, the defendant can become an unwitting victim whose expertly
advised "cop-out" primarily benefits his lawyer as well as the public's
and the criminal system's increasing anxiety over heavy caseloads.
As a consequence of this plea oriented policy with its attendant pres-
sures and demands, competent counsel is not always assured. Without a
proper assessment of his bargaining position, a criminal defendant can
hardly enter a voluntary and understanding plea. Yet due to the diffi-
culty in proving ineffective assistance under the present standards
defendants who are urged into "bargains" on erroneous, hastily-formed
legal advice are left without any recourse. On this basis, it is submitted
that a truly realistic standard of effective assistance of counsel must
give recognition to the pressured milieu of the plea bargaining process;
a standard gauged to the fact that too many criminal attorneys are not
skilled legal practitioners, well versed in the law relating to confes-
sions, searches, and seizures, who carefully assess the strength of the
prosecution's case before recommending a course of action.86
83. Blumbert, Covert Contingencies in the Right to Assistance of Counsel, 20 VAND.
L. REv. 581, 589 (1967).
84. A. TREBACH, THE RATIONING OF JUSTICE 148 (1968).
85. Blumberg, Lawyers with Convictions, 4 TRANS-ACTION 18, 21 (July/Aug. 1967).




DUTY OF THE COURTS IN FASHIONING A STANDARD
In effect, the courts primary duty in determining under what cir-
cumstances a defendant is deprived of effective assistance of counsel
and when counsel's advice was not within the "range of competency"
of most criminal lawyers must turn on facts outside the record: whether
a substantial defense was available, whether counsel consulted with the
defendant and investigated properly, whether the alleged omissions
were the result of inadequate preparation, rather than strategy judg-
ments. 87 Ultimately then, attention must be directed to the direct
relation between a lawyer's representation and the voluntarily and
understandingly entered plea. Only when a standard integrates all of
these considerations will a guilty plea represent an intelligent choice
among alternatives. 88
Therefore, the courts are constitutionally compelled to mollify the
extremist nature of the older standards of shocking dereliction and
gross incompetency in order to preserve the validity of an underlying
plea. After having perused past and present caselaw on the subject,
however, one must admit that the older standards, which were never
conceptualized or designed with the novelty of plea bargaining in mind,
remain enshrined. These standards must be deracinated and replaced
with a more realistic standard of reasonably effective advocacy which
would conceivably compel greater efforts by defense counsel in investi-
gation, in the pursuance of possible suppression issues and in fuller dis-
closure of legal and factual information.
CONCLUSION
The protection of a defendant's rights in the plea bargaining process
can be substantially enhanced by requiring reasonably competent ad-
vocacy of attorneys representing these defendants. Yet, as this article
has attempted to demonstrate the courts have displayed concern
primarily with the cases of clear, shocking incompetency. As a result,
defendants are required to assume more than the risk of ordinary
error, finding that they have surrendered valuable rights in reliance
upon faulty legal advice.
Hopefully, the courts will become more sympathetic to this dilemma
87. Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARV. L
REv. 1434, 1449 (1965).
88. United States ex rel. Curtis v. Zelkner, 466 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1972).
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by formulating the "range of competency" test into a standard inclu-
sive enough to provide relief for those clients who were advised in a
manner not so inept as to be labeled as shocking, but so unreasonably
ineffective as to be outside of the "range of competency" demanded of
criminal lawyers. For only when such a standard of ineffective assistance
has evolved will the plea requirements of voluntariness and understand-
ing have attained their full significance and will defendants be able to
truly "bargain" with the prosecution.
PAUL R. MARKs
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